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I. INTRODUCTION
In attempting to provide policy advice to judges, legislators,
administrators, and other legal actors, law and economics
scholarship pays close attention to the incentive effects that legal
rules have on the citizens subject to them. This consequentialist
focus on the effects of law means that law and economics scholarship
requires a descriptive account of how people do (or will) react to
various possible legal regimes. Traditionally, scholars in the field
have relied on rational choice theory (RCT) for this account, although
there has always been diversity in the precise vision of rational
behavior that researchers assume. Some researchers assume that
actors will seek to maximize their wealth, while others assume only
that actors will seek to maximize their broader self-interest. Still
others make no assumptions about “ends,” assuming only that actors
will maximize their subjective expected utility, however defined.1
Some researchers assume actors act on perfect information, while
others assume that actors acquire information only to the point at
which the marginal costs of acquisition exceed the marginal
benefits.2 Despite the variations as to specifics, rationalist accounts
of behavior are notable for assuming optimizing behavior on the part
of actors.3
Perhaps as few as ten years ago, and certainly as few as fifteen,
the notion that researchers should base their analyses on behavioral
assumptions that are inconsistent with RCT—that is, that actors do

* Professor of Law, UCLA. Helpful comments from Iman Anabtawi, Steve Bainbridge, Tom Ulen, and participants of the Florida State University College of Law’s symposium on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions are gratefully acknowledged.
1. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1060-66 (2000).
2. This strand of RCT thinking became widespread as a result of Stigler’s work. See
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
3. Cf. Gerd Gigerenzer, Striking a Blow for Sanity in Theories of Rationality, in
MODELS OF A MAN: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF HERBERT A. SIMON 389, 390-95 (Mie Augier &
James G. March eds., 2004) (distinguishing theories of bounded rationality from theories of
optimization under constraints).
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not, at a minimum, maximize their expected utility given available
information—was virtual heresy in the law and economics community.4 This is not to say that law and economics scholars did not
believe that people’s actions deviate at times from the optimization
assumption of RCT; rather, that this aspect of reality was simply not
useful for the purpose of devising legal policy because deviations
were random and unpredictable, because competition would drive
such errors out of legal markets, or because adding new elements to
behavioral models would complicate analysis to the point that prediction would become impossible.
Today, the approach to scholarly inquiry often called “behavioral
law and economics,” which draws on the interdisciplinary behavioraldecision-theory (BDT) literature for its behavioral assumptions, is
recognized as an acceptable methodology, if not yet the dominant
one, in the mainstream law and economics community. That is, most
law and economics scholars would agree with the statement that
citizens often behave in ways not predicted by RCT, and that taking
into account the ways in which actors deviate in their
decisionmaking behavior from the predictions of RCT can, in at least
some instances, enrich our understanding of law-relevant behavior
and improve the quality of normative legal policy prescriptions.
The general acceptance of the behavioral law and economics
approach raises an important methodological question for law and
economics scholars. For purposes of deriving policy recommendations, how should the researcher determine whether to assume strict
RCT behavior or something more consistent with the BDT literature,
such as bounded rationality or susceptibility to cognitive biases?
Although most scholars now are willing to assume that strict
rationality is neither ubiquitous nor always the most useful
behavioral assumption for the purposes of crafting legal scholarship,
this does not suggest that the opposite is true. That is, it is almost
certainly the case that in many law-relevant situations, many actors
evaluate information in a relatively unbiased way, make decisions
that maximize their expected utility given available information, and
implicitly measure utility in terms of their selfish interest. Notwithstanding recent accusations to the contrary,5 most legal scholars who
4. This generalization should not, of course, be interpreted as a claim that all law
and economics scholars rejected non-RCT assumptions. Challenges to the optimization assumption by interdisciplinary luminaries such as Herbert Simon and Oliver Williamson
have long been well known, if mostly disregarded in practice, in the law and economics
community. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,
63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1973).
5. Compare Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67
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identify with the behavioral law and economics movement would
agree with this statement.
Professor Klick’s comment in this symposium issue,6 which
responds to my previously published work on the subject of standard
form contracts, implicitly provides two answers to this methodological
question. The first response, which I think resonates quite clearly in
Klick’s comment, can be paraphrased as follows: the scientific method
should be used to determine whether an RCT-based or BDT-based
assumption is empirically accurate in the law-relevant circumstances
under consideration. The second response is that, until proven otherwise, researchers should presume that citizens act in accordance
with RCT. Admittedly, this latter response is less clearly implied by
Klick than the former, but I think it is a fair reading of his article.
In this rejoinder to Klick, I argue that the first response is
unobjectionable but often not helpful for the purposes of legal
scholarship, and that the second response should be rejected.
Instead, I propose that the choice between using an RCT-based
behavioral assumption and a BDT-based behavioral assumption in
law and economics analysis should turn on the relative plausibility of
competing accounts in light of existing knowledge, which is often
incomplete and indeterminate.
This Comment proceeds in three parts: Part II agrees with Klick
that law and economics scholars should attempt to rely on the
scientific method to understand law-relevant behavior but argues
that, in practice, this goal will often prove elusive. Part III rejects
Klick’s implication that RCT-based behavioral assumptions should
be presumed true unless proven false—what I will call the
“possibility” argument. Part IV proposes and defends the alternative
methodological standard of relative “plausibility.” Part V concludes.
II. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
In a world of no transaction costs and perfect informationprocessing capabilities among buyers, seller-drafted standard form
contracts should include only efficient terms, meaning that no
alternative set of terms would make buyers and sellers jointly better
off.7 If the market is competitive, only sellers who offer efficient
(2002) (claiming that BDT proponents assert that actors always act inconsistently with
RCT), with Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1722 (2003) (calling Mitchell’s claim “a giant straw
man”).
6. Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price
Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555 (2005).
7. For an excellent explication of this reasoning, see Richard Craswell, Passing on
the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43
STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
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terms could succeed in attracting buyers.8 A monopolistic seller could
offer inefficient terms without losing all of his customers, but he will
maximize his profit in most cases by offering an efficient set of terms
and charging a monopolistic price rather than by offering inefficient
seller-preferred terms and a correspondingly lower price.9
Based on a BDT-based behavioral assumption derived from
empirical research on consumer decisionmaking, I have argued that
standard form contracts are likely to contain inefficient terms
because most buyers will compare only a subset of product attributes
(“salient” attributes) among sellers when making a purchase
decision, even when all contract terms are readily available and,
thus, RCT would suggest that buyers would implicitly price all of
them as part of the purchase decision.10 Because making nonsalient
attributes “low quality” will save the seller money and not cost the
seller customers, sellers will have a profit incentive to skimp on
quality for such attributes. If price is a salient attribute for buyers,
sellers in a competitive market will actually be forced by market
pressure to make nonsalient attributes low quality, whether or not
this is the efficient level of quality for those attributes. This is
because they will need the resulting cost savings in order to compete
on price, which they must do to retain customers.11 Reputational
costs will provide a counterweight to this tendency, but if buyers are
unlikely to learn the true quality of a nonsalient attribute after
making a purchase, this constraint is substantially weakened.12
Because form terms will often be nonsalient attributes to buyers,
and because the content of such terms will become known to buyers
only infrequently even after purchase (they usually become relevant
only in the unusual case in which something goes wrong), sellers will
often have an incentive to draft self-serving form terms without
regard to efficiency.13 On the basis of this logic, I critique the current
judicial attitude toward challenges to the enforceability of standard
form contracts and present a normative argument for how legal
doctrine can be adjusted to better promote contractual efficiency.14
Klick agrees, at least arguendo, that standard form contracts
contain at least some inefficient terms,15 but he offers a competing
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 116 (6th ed.
2003).
9. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 7, at 372.
10. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243-44 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1239-42.
13. Id. at 1243-44.
14. Id. at 1244-95. The particulars of my policy argument are not important for the
purposes of this Comment.
15. Klick, supra note 6, at 556.
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hypothesis for why this is the case. His hypothesis, which is
consistent with an RCT-based set of behavioral assumptions, is that
sellers provide inefficient terms (presumably inefficient terms that
are favorable to sellers) to price discriminate among buyers.16 Buyers
with a high value for time will rationally accept the form terms,
giving a windfall to sellers.17 Buyers with a lower value for time will
choose (rationally) to haggle over the inefficient and undesirable (to
buyers) terms, at which point sellers will give ground to make the
sale.18 By forcing buyers to separate themselves into two types,
sellers will increase profits.19
The two behavioral hypotheses offered by Klick and myself might
lead to very different policy implications. My theory suggests that
efficiency in contracting could be enhanced if courts refuse to enforce
form terms in some instances. Under Klick’s theory, it is less clear
that state interference with form contract terms could enhance
overall efficiency. This raises the question of which behavioral
assumption we should rely upon—my BDT-based assumption or
Klick’s RCT-based assumption—as the basis for further analysis of
how the law should treat standard form contracts. Klick suggests
that we ought to derive testable predictions from both assumptions,
with particular focus on where the assumptions lead to different
predictions, and then conduct research to determine which
assumption receives empirical support in the real world.20
In theory, Klick’s proposal is eminently sensible, and I certainly
support the widespread drumbeat for legal scholars to conduct more
empirical analysis than our corner of the academy has produced
historically.21 Yet the proposal also has a certain ivory-tower
sensibility to it that fails to adequately account for an important
practical difference between the purpose of legal scholarship and that
of scholarly work in other disciplines. Legal scholarship seeks to
provide policy guidance to lawmakers, and waiting for definitive
empirical support for a behavioral assumption before action is taken
16. Id. at 564.
17. Id. at 565-66.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 569 (“[E]mpirical testing is clearly important before we advance policy
prescriptions regarding the treatment of standardized terms in the courts.”); id. at 561
(stating that my behavioral theory should be tested empirically before the policy prescriptions that follow are adopted).
21. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807,
810-15; Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between
the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 348-51 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1998); Peter H. Schuck,
Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 333-35
(1989). See generally Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 789 (generally lauding empirical legal scholarship and encouraging more of it).
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often equates with maintaining the status quo ante, whatever it may
be, and on whatever behavioral assumption it may be based. The
reality is that we rarely generate uncontestable empirical results
relevant to important legal questions in any kind of a timely way.22
While this is surely a goal worth striving for, it is not one that we are
likely to attain all that often.
There are multiple reasons for this. The most obvious is that careful empirical testing of law-relevant behavior in specifically defined
settings is both time- and resource-intensive, and the list of topics
that would benefit from such study is quite long compared to the list
of scholars doing this work. Potentially even more troubling, however, is that the data required for such studies is often impossible (or
virtually impossible) to obtain and, even when it can be obtained, the
results themselves or the implications to be drawn from the results
will often be contestable and ultimately indeterminate.23
Consider, for example, Klick’s claim that my behavioral model
implies that inefficient, seller-preferred terms should be more likely
to appear when consumers are “more homogenous” (because terms
that are nonsalient to some customers, and therefore exploitable, will
be nonsalient to most or all), while “the price discrimination model
suggests that [such] terms are more likely when consumer
heterogeneity is greater.”24 Imagine that a dedicated researcher
relied on this statement as the basis for his efforts to conduct a test
to determine which of the two theories is empirically justified. First,
the researcher would have to develop methods for determining which
terms found in form contracts are efficient and which are inefficient,
for identifying all members of the customer class, and for measuring
the heterogeneity of customers. I would like to be proven wrong, but I
doubt that either Klick or I will be walking and talking, much less
writing, when this feat is accomplished. The task is not theoretically
impossible, but it would be quite difficult in practice. Second, the
researcher would have to apply this methodology to many contracts
in many industries in order to have enough statistical power to
ensure that the test results are significant and to ensure that results
are not idiosyncratic to, say, the widget industry. Third, the results
would have to show a strong correlation—rather than a weak one—
between either heterogeneity or homogeneity of buyer preferences
22. See Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and
Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1036-37 (identifying fewer than thirty empirical studies
specifically tied to arguments about contract law doctrine over a fifteen-year period).
23. See id. at 1056-61 (critiquing the usefulness of empirical studies to normative
arguments about contract law); cf. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 864-65 (2003) (arguing that economic models are often indeterminate because we lack sufficient information about empirical conditions and it is unlikely that we will ever have better information).
24. Klick, supra note 6, at 568.
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and inefficient form terms. This is possible, but obviously not
guaranteed.
Finally, let us assume that the researcher determines that as
heterogeneity in buyer preferences increases, the presence of
inefficient, seller-preferred terms also increases. Should we then
conclude that the price discrimination hypothesis has won the empirical competition? I certainly do not think so, because there are explanations consistent with my theory that would explain why sellers
might provide inefficient form terms even if consumer preferences
are heterogeneous. For example, it might be that within a heterogeneous buyer population there is a strong correlation between a
certain preference type and the propensity to complain about seller
performance or to file lawsuits. This could create an incentive for
sellers to draft inefficient form terms that tend to be nonsalient to
the desired (“profitable”) type of buyer and tend to be salient to the
undesired (“unprofitable”) type of buyer, thus driving away the latter
without deterring the former.25 In other words, a correlation between
inefficient terms and buyer heterogeneity is not necessarily inconsistent with my behavioral theory.
My goal is neither to take issue with Klick’s call for empirical
testing of competing hypotheses, which is certainly a useful thing to
do, nor to take issue with his suggestions concerning what particular
empirical tests might make sense in this context. Rather, my claim is
merely that lawmakers, and therefore legal scholars who wish to
provide them with policy advice, often do not have the luxury of
demanding clear, irrefutable, empirical proof of a behavioral
assumption’s veracity in a particular law-relevant context, because
such proof is likely to be a long time in coming and may never come
at all. In the case of standard form contracts, I am skeptical that we
will ever have empirical evidence that decisively vanquishes either
Klick’s theory or mine. If I am correct about this, the obvious
question is, how should law and economics scholars proceed?
III. A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY DEFAULT ASSUMPTION?
Regardless of how difficult it might be to conduct an empirical
competition between my BDT-based behavioral assumption and
Klick’s competing RCT-based assumption, two facts seem beyond
argument: (1) no such competition has been conducted to date, and
(2) notwithstanding this, courts and legislatures must deal with the
fact of standard form contracts every day. Since the policy implications of the two behavioral assumptions are different (at least
arguably), how should we determine which assumption to rely upon

25. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1238-39.
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for the purpose of advising legal policymakers?
As much as behavioral law and economics has become accepted
as a research methodology, my sense is that, within the law and
economics community, there is still a strong tendency to view RCT
as the default set of behavioral assumptions. The primary
manifestation of this is the emphasis among some law and
economics scholars on “possibility stories.” Confronted with an
explanation of behavior that appears inconsistent with usual RCT
assumptions, the law and economics scholar contrives a narrative
that explains the observed behavior in a way that is consistent
with RCT.
For example, a first-order RCT prediction might be that popular
restaurants with more demand than capacity would raise their prices
so that the market will clear. Observing long lines outside of a
popular restaurant, a law and economics scholar might offer the
explanation that lines will create “buzz” for the restaurant, and that
the expected increase in long-term profits as a result of the
reputational capital the restaurant thereby creates will outweigh the
short-term profits being sacrificed by holding prices below the
market-clearing level. While inconsistent with the standard premise
that price will rise when demand exceeds supply, this creative
explanation harmonizes the empirical observation with RCT. The
problem is not that the explanation is necessarily wrong; it is that
RCT is sufficiently malleable that any mildly clever economist can
conjure up a possibility story to explain virtually any empirical
observation, so there is no a priori reason to assume that the
explanation is right.
Klick’s paper is an example of such a possibility story.
Confronted with my claim that inefficient form contract terms are
the result of buyers’ limited cognitive resources, which causes
them to limit the data that they analyze as part of their purchase
decision, he presents an alternative hypothesis consistent with a
RCT-based set of behavioral assumptions: Sellers use inefficient
terms as a price discrimination technique that will maximize their
profits.26
There is nothing inherently objectionable to responding to BDTbased theories with RCT-based possibility stories. It is always
sensible to consider multiple explanations for an observed outcome
before assuming one is correct and proceeding to develop policy
recommendations on the basis of it. But I think that there is more
going on here than brainstorming. The implication of RCT-based
possibility stories is that they serve to trump all but the most
airtight BDT-based explanations. As Klick writes, law and
26. Klick, supra note 6, at 564.
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economics scholars
should be careful not to invoke behavioral explanations—
developed atheoretically on the basis of observation as opposed to
rigorous testing—simply because existing economic theory is not
borne out empirically. Instead, we should adopt behavioral
explanations only if they can explain systematic cross-sectional
and time-series variation, while keeping in mind that conventional
theory might provide some unexplored insights.27

The subtext, I think, is that RCT assumptions should be the default
standard, and that a possibility story consistent with RCT should be
given preference over a BDT-based explanation unless and until the
BDT-based theory is definitively proven beyond all doubt.
In his conclusion, Klick warns that “we need to be more hesitant
in using insights from psychology to rationalize unexpected empirical
observations ex post,”28 which again, I think, has the subtext that
BDT-based explanations are entitled to citizenship in the law and
economics nation, but only second-class citizenship. It is preferable to
rationalize unexpected empirical observations with accounts that are
consistent with RCT rather than with accounts that are not.
Although I might be reading more into Klick’s paper on this point
than is actually there, I am quite sure that the default RCT presumption is held by many, if not most, law and economics scholars.
The reason for this, I believe, is rooted in two core myths, neither of
which is true: (1) RCT-based explanations of behavior are more parsimonious than their BDT-based cousins,29 and (2) RCT-based
explanations are better able to generate testable, falsifiable predictions.30
Parsimony may be an aesthetic virtue for those inclined to
mathematical modeling, but it has little virtue in a behavioral
assumption that underlies a claim about what legal policy is most
efficacious in a particular, well-defined context.31 If we wish to devise
recommendations for how courts or legislatures should address
standard form contracts, the best theory is the most accurate one, not
the leanest. In any event, it is not necessarily the case that RCTbased theories are more parsimonious than BDT-based theories.
Klick’s theory assumes that buyers will implicitly price all form
contract terms as part of their purchase decision (this is essential for
27. Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 569.
29. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Klick, supra note 6, at 557 (“[T]he comparative advantage of [non-behavioral] economic analysis [is that it] generates testable hypotheses about cross-sectional and
time-series variation in behavior.”).
31. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1072.
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buyers to determine whether it is worth their time to bargain for
better terms); my theory assumes that buyers will price only a subset
of salient terms. It is true that my theory begs the question of how
buyers will determine which terms are salient, and another layer of
theory is needed to address this issue. But Klick’s theory begs the
question of which terms sellers will use as vehicles for price
discrimination, which the first cut of his theory does not specify.
Klick’s theory also requires the assumptions that bargaining is costly
and information acquisition is not costly, while my theory does not
require any assumptions about the costs of bargaining or of
information acquisition.
It is often claimed that RCT generates testable predictions ex ante,
whereas BDT-based explanations are ad hoc, ex post explanations
devoid of a theory that cannot generate determinate predictions.32 This
charge is also grossly unfair. RCT generates a determinate set of
predictions only in its thinnest form, and at this level the predictions
are not testable. What I have called the “definitional” version33 of RCT
predicts that individuals will act to maximize their subjective expected
utility (SEU). The problem is that SEU cannot be observed, so the
prediction is not testable. RCT adherents often infer from the actions
an individual actually takes what actions maximize his SEU,34 but this
sleight of hand reduces RCT to a tautology. To make RCT-based
theories falsifiable, the theorist must make choices about a series of
assumptions—choices that are ad hoc and ex post. Klick’s comment
demonstrates this problem. If we assume low transaction and
information acquisition costs, we would predict that terms in standard
form contracts would always be efficient. If we assume that bargaining
costs are high, as Klick’s theory implicitly does, sellers might use
inefficient terms to price discriminate between buyers with high and
low time values. But, then again, this prediction is consistent with
RCT only if we implicitly assume that the benefit of price
discrimination for sellers exceeds the costs to them of haggling with
low-time-value buyers. If seller transaction costs are high, it is more
likely that they will draft only efficient terms and not haggle.
In other words, RCT does not provide a determinate set of
falsifiable behavioral predictions because RCT-based predictions
always require assumptions about factors like individual utility
functions, transaction costs, information acquisition costs, and the
like. Law and economics scholars can (and do) create testable
predictions by specifying these parameters, but if subsequent data is
32. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 29, at 1559 (claiming that predictions as to what “rational man” would do in a situation are clear, whereas predictions of what “behavioral
man” would do are not).
33. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1061-62.
34. See Klick, supra note 6, at 561 n.38.
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inconsistent with the predictions, RCT is always flexible enough to
allow the theorist to explain the results as consistent with RCT.
On close inspection, when a legal scholar needs to select a set of
behavioral assumptions on which to build a normative analysis of
legal policy, RCT lacks an obvious a priori advantage relative to
BDT. To use a BDT term, only the existence of a status quo bias35 in
the law and economics community—one that that can be overcome
only with overwhelming evidence—can explain why RCT-based
assumptions should be made the default preference of scholars.
IV. PLAUSIBILITY AND STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
Rather than relying on possibility stories as a basis for assuming
that citizens in law-relevant circumstances behave in accordance with
RCT unless and until definitive evidence proves otherwise, I propose
that law and economics scholars employ the following test for
determining what behavioral assumptions to employ in legal policy
analysis: choose the set of assumptions that is most plausible. By this, I
mean that law and economics scholars should be pragmatic rather
than doctrinaire in their choice of behavioral assumptions. We should
take into account relevant empirical and experimental data (even
when the data is not definitive), less rigorous armchair empiricism in
the absence of data vetted by statistical analysis, and the logical
implications of both of these data sources. We should then determine
what set of behavioral assumptions is most likely to explain behavior
in the context of interest to legal policy. That set of assumptions,
whether it is more consistent with RCT or findings of BDT research,
should then serve as the basis for deriving policy recommendations.
By accepting plausibility as a standard rather than demanding
incontrovertible proof, I do not suggest that legal scholars should
shrink from developing falsifiable hypotheses and testing them
empirically. Rather, I merely recognize the reality that definitive
proof will often be unavailable or indeterminate but that the law
nonetheless must provide mechanisms by which citizens can order
their affairs as best it can.
Turning to the issue of how the law should treat terms in standard form contracts, I contend that my behavioral theory outdistances Klick’s in a plausibility competition and, therefore, should
serve as the basis for policy analysis unless and until it is supplanted
by an even more plausible theory. I believe that Klick’s theory, while
possible, is quite implausible, and that the questions Klick raises
concerning my theory do not undermine its plausibility.
35. On the status quo bias, see William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); and Russell Korobkin, The
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).
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The first hint that Klick’s theory is implausible comes from
casual empiricism drawn from real-world experience. Most
standard form contracts—at least in the consumer context on which
both Klick and I focus our attention36—are adhesion contracts; that
is, they are offered by sellers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.37 Klick’s
price discrimination hypothesis implicitly assumes that sellers
agree to redraft or otherwise supplant inefficient, seller-preferred
form contract terms when buyers reveal that they are low-timevalue types. But in my experience, sellers rarely are willing to
haggle over their form terms, no matter how patient the buyer
might be. There are some exceptions to this rule, of course; for
example, residential real estate contracts might be one. But in the
great majority of form-contracting situations, the price
discrimination theory is implausible.
The second problem with Klick’s hypothesis is that it fails to
explain why market competition would not force sellers to offer
buyers only efficient contracts. A buyer presented with a set of
inefficient, pro-seller terms has two alternatives to accepting the
offer: he can negotiate, as Klick’s approach assumes, but he also can
shop elsewhere. Why will he not choose the latter option? This
problem can be solved if we assume that shopping is more costly than
bargaining, because this would mean that shopping is always
dominated by the two alternative courses of action Klick considers.
This move, however, leaves Klick’s theory reliant on two somewhat
inconsistent assumptions: (1) buyers costlessly learn and understand
the terms of one seller’s complicated form contract (this is necessary
in order for them to determine whether it is worth their time to
bargain for better terms); but (2) learning and understanding the
terms of a second seller’s form contract is prohibitively costly.
Assuming that shopping is more costly than bargaining for buyers, sellers effectively become monopolists, but this leads us to the
third and most significant problem with Klick’s theory: in most cases,
it is not in the interest of rational sellers to use inefficient, pro-seller
terms as a price discrimination mechanism. If buyers optimize, as
Klick’s theory assumes, monopolist sellers can maximize the difference between buyers’ willingness to pay (rather than bargain or exit
the market) and the costs of production by providing efficient terms
and a supracompetitive nominal price. This strategy maximizes the
number of buyers who will accept the seller’s standard offer and
minimizes the number of buyers who will bargain for a better deal.

36. Klick’s hypothesis might be more plausible in business-to-business transactions,
in which a seller’s standard form is more likely to be a starting point for bargaining than a
nonnegotiable offer.
37. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1258.
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To bolster his theory, Klick describes a series of empirical
examples of price discrimination activities conducted by sellers. Not
coincidentally, however, in all of these examples the seller uses
nominal price, rather than terms, as the discrimination mechanism.38
For example, sellers differentiate buyer types by offering lower prices
in outlet malls that take more time for buyers to reach than other
stores and by offering lower prices to buyers who invest time in
clipping coupons.39 It might make sense to price discriminate with
terms under some specific conditions, but the hypothesis is
implausible generally because rational sellers usually would use
nominal price rather than terms to price discriminate.40
Klick raises two challenges to the plausibility of my theory that
buyer bounded rationality causes profit-maximizing sellers to seed
standard form contracts with seller-preferred nonsalient terms,
whether or not these are efficient. First, Klick criticizes an
apparent inconsistency in the theory: buyers are assumed to be
boundedly rational and, as a result, fail to act in a way that
maximizes expected utility, while sellers are assumed to be fully
rational profit maximizers.41 In fact, my theory does not assume
that seller rationality is less “bounded” than buyer rationality,42
only that sellers have access to feedback mechanisms that buyers
do not have (a point Klick concedes).43 No doubt, sellers will often
fail to draft the optimal set of contract terms. But, in a competitive
market, sellers who fail to provide the profit-maximizing set of
contract terms will not be able to compete effectively on price and
will lose customers. This market feedback will give them both the
information and the incentive to adjust their terms.44 Buyers lack
this degree of feedback and incentive. Most buyers will never know
whether a standard form contract to which they are a party
contains inefficient terms because they lack access to counterfactual
contracts that are economically feasible, and there are no
evolutionary pressures that will drive buyers who happen to accept
inefficient terms “out of the market” over time.
38. Klick, supra note 6, at 565 (citing Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, Imperfect
Price Discrimination and Welfare, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1982)).
39. Id.
40. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1211-12 (providing a more complete explanation);
see also Craswell, supra note 7, at 372; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s
Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638 (1996); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 607-08 (1982); Posner, supra note 23, at 843; George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1321 (1981).
41. Klick, supra note 6, at 561.
42. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1289.
43. Klick, supra note 6, at 561-62.
44. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1219 n.53.
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Second, Klick suggests that form terms that are at one point in
time nonsalient to a buyer will become salient when a low-probability
event occurs (such as a product failure that leads to a dispute), which
effectively forces the buyer to become more familiar with the
contract’s fine print, in turn suggesting that sellers’ incentives to
draft inefficient pro-seller terms will be constrained by reputational
consequences.45 I agree with Klick’s point—that is, I believe that fear
of the reputational costs associated with angry buyers will mitigate
the market incentive sellers face to draft pro-seller terms whether or
not they are efficient—but I do not believe that this point is
inconsistent with the theory I propose. Although reputational costs
mitigate sellers’ incentives, they do not completely eliminate them.
Because form contracts usually become relevant only when a lowprobability event occurs, there is no reason to believe nonsalient
terms will become salient to most buyers. In addition, there is likely
to be an adverse selection problem: If buyers who complain about the
seller’s wares—and, in so doing, have occasion to become aware of
the contents of the form terms—are less profitable to sellers than
other buyers (because they are the type of buyers more likely to seek
refunds, repairs or replacements, litigate, and so on), sellers might
have an additional incentive to draft abusive terms in an effort to
avoid the future business of this troublesome customer group.46
As briefly described above, my argument is based on the following
(abbreviated) chain of reasoning:
(1) empirical evidence suggests that buyers will implicitly price
only a subset of product attributes when making purchase
decisions;
(2) contract terms are product attributes;
(3) contract terms will often be “nonsalient” (that is, not priced);
(4) sellers will face market pressure to skimp on nonsalient
atributes, whether or not this is efficient, in order to have more
resources to expend on making salient attributes attractive (such
as keeping prices low);
(5) one-sided terms will become salient to some buyers with
experience, thus mitigating this incentive, but not to most, thus
not eliminating the incentive.47
There is no empirical data relevant to parts (2) through (5) of this
reasoning. But this should not be the test of the theory’s acceptance.
The appropriate question is whether my account is more plausible
than the alternatives, such as the traditional RCT account that
cognitive capabilities are infinite so market pressure ensures all form
45. Klick, supra note 6, at 562.
46. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1240-41.
47. See id. passim.
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contract terms are efficient or Klick’s theory that sellers use
inefficient, pro-seller terms as a price discrimination tool. The most
plausible account should be used as the behavioral basis for debates
on how the law should treat standard form contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
The core insights of law and economics analysis, in my opinion,
are that people respond to incentives, that the law can thus affect
behavior, and that, therefore, law has efficiency as well as distributive consequences.48 None of these core insights are conditioned on
the assumption that citizens subject to the law always act in a way
that is consistent with RCT. Law and economics analysis requires
assumptions about behavior, but they need not be RCT assumptions.
The effectiveness of legal policy prescriptions depends on the
accuracy of the behavioral assumptions that underlie them, which
means we should use scientific methods to test our behavioral
assumptions concerning law-relevant circumstances whenever
possible. But the law must act; it cannot wait for empirical certainty.
So, in many—perhaps most—cases, our touchstone must be
plausibility.

48. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1054.

